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Abstract - The proliferation of Bluetooth mobile device 
communications into all aspects of modern society raises 
security questions by both academicians and practitioners. This 
environment prompted an investigation into the real-world use 
of Bluetooth protocols along with an analysis of documented 
security attacks. The experiment discussed in this paper 
collected data for one week in a local coffee shop. The data 
collection took about an hour each day and identified 478 
distinct devices. The contribution of this research is two-fold. 
First, it provides insight into real-world Bluetooth protocols that 
are being utilized by the general public. Second, it provides 
foundational research that is necessary for future Bluetooth 
penetration testing research. 
Keywords-Bluetooth, Bluetooth Detection, Mobile Devices  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile phones are ubiquitous fixtures in today’s modern 
society.  Forester predicts that global smartphone 
subscriptions will hit 3.8 billion and reach 66% of the 
population by 2022 [1]. Coupling this information with 
Statista data indicating that worldwide Bluetooth-enabled 
devices will reach 10 billion by the end of 2018 highlights the 
idea that Bluetooth technology is not limited to mobile 
phones. The technology is also pervasive in a range of other 
device types [2-4].  
IHS Technology asserts that “the market for consumer 
health and fitness electronics is the fastest growing segment 
of the medical electronics industry” [4]. Informa Telecoms & 
Media reported that there were over 160 Bluetooth Low 
Energy fitness devices produced in 2014, encompassing more 
than 70 distinct device categories [2]. Bluetooth Low Energy 
is used in fitness wearables from numerous manufacturers, 
such as Fitbit, Apple, Garmin, Samsung and Xiaomi [5]. 
Bluetooth-enabled devices are starting to be visible in 
mainstream healthcare devices. A recent report states that a 
Bluetooth-enabled heart monitor was recently implanted in a 
patient [6]. 
The native support for Bluetooth in all major smartphone 
and tablet operating systems also makes it an appealing 
technology for managing smart home accessories utilizing the 
Internet of Things (IoT) [2, 7]. For the same reason, Bluetooth 
is becoming a fixture in the automotive industry [2]. Bluetooth 
is currently used in hands-free communication and is a 
potential wireless solution for the On-Board Diagnostics 
(OBD) market [3]. It is starting to be used by smartphone apps 
to unlock and start automobiles [8]. As Ibn Minar and Tarique 
[9] note, “One of the major advantages of Bluetooth 
technology is that it operates in a license-free Industrial, 
Scientific and Medical (ISM) band ranging from 2.4 to 2.4835 
GHz”. This makes Bluetooth an attractive interface 
technology along with presenting possibilities for improving 
device-to-device communication and capability expansion, 
much like research into mesh network development [10-12]. 
The evolution of this environment prompts the idea that 
Bluetooth capabilities present a logical attack vector and that 
the technology potentially puts both individuals and 
businesses at risk. To investigate this idea, an understanding 
of the practical pervasiveness of various Bluetooth protocols 
needs to be examined in conjunction with identifying 
documented viable attacks on Bluetooth-enabled devices.  
This research paper is derived from an MSc thesis 
submission at the University of South Alabama [13]. The 
contribution of this research is two-fold. First, it provides 
insight into real-world Bluetooth protocols that are being 
utilized by the public. It also provides insight into tool 
capabilities that are freely available for conducting research 
into detecting Bluetooth protocols. Second, it provides 
foundational research that is necessary for future Bluetooth 
penetration research, device vulnerability, and risk mitigation 
strategies.  
The balance of the paper is structured as follows: Section 
II examines published Bluetooth vulnerability research. 
Section III presents the methodology used in this case study. 
Section IV presents the data, discusses results and explores 
observations. The last section draws conclusions and presents 
ideas for future work in this area 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The pervasiveness of mobile device residual data [14-16], 
the security implications associated with mobile devices [17-
19], and inherent Bluetooth capabilities in many of these 
devices is prompting interest from both academicians and 
practitioners. Coupling this information with research that 
indicates mobile device residual data, in general, is 
increasingly being used in a legal context heightens the 
necessity to understand relevant Bluetooth vulnerabilities [20, 
21].   
Recent research shows that despite iterative advances and 
improvements made by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group 
(SIG), inherent vulnerabilities remain in Bluetooth protocols 
that can allow devices to be exploited [22]. For example, 
O’Connor and Reeves [23] noted that Bluetooth is often 
targeted by attackers because it allows devices to be accessed 
without a physical connection. One specific vulnerability 
allows a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack to exploit the 
pairing process between two devices [24-26]. More recently, 
researchers have also outlined vulnerabilities associated with 
the newest Bluetooth protocol, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), 
which is utilized in fitness and medical devices to reduce 
power consumption and prolong battery life [27, 28]. While 
many of these vulnerabilities have been reported in the last 
decade, research has shown that weaknesses in the Bluetooth 
protocol have existed since its creation [29].  
While some researchers have examined the susceptibility 
of Bluetooth technology, others have focused on 
vulnerabilities specific to specific protocol versions. Table I 
presents Bluetooth vulnerabilities that have been documented 
in peer-reviewed journals and conference papers which 
specify weaknesses in distinct Bluetooth versions [24-33]. 
A. Bluetooth Research 
Whenever the Bluetooth core specification is updated, 
new features are added along with patches for known bugs. 
Moreover, SIG has also attempted to enhance Bluetooth 
security standards in response to any vulnerabilities reported 
in academia [24, 29, 33]. For example, as shown in Table I, 
Jakobsson and Wetzel [29] revealed the potential for attackers 
to eavesdrop on Bluetooth connections with a MitM attack. 
Jakobsson and Wetzel also demonstrated the relative ease 
with which attackers could circumvent the encryption keys 
employed in the first Bluetooth core specification due to the 
limited bit space allotted for encryption keys. Based on these 
findings, Jakobsson and Wetzel suggested that Bluetooth 
technology could be used to track devices and predict patterns 
of human behavior.  
In 2003, Kügler [32] extended the work of Jakobsson and 
Wetzel [29] by demonstrating a similar MitM attack on 
devices using Bluetooth v1.1. While Jakobsson and Wetzel 
[29] were only able to initiate a MitM attack if both legitimate 
devices were set as either master or slave, Kügler [32] was 
able to do so regardless of the master/slave configuration of 
the devices. Separately, Hager and Midkiff [30, 31] 
demonstrated how it was possible for an attacker to 
successfully spoof a Bluetooth address used by another 
legitimate device, despite the update to the Bluetooth core 
specification (from v1.1 to v1.2). The idea behind this attack 
was that the spoofed address could then be used to initiate a 
connection to other unsuspecting users as if it were the 
original device. Hager and Midkiff [30, 31] also confirmed the 
encryption vulnerability first reported by Jakobsson and 
Wetzel [29]. 
In 2007, the Bluetooth SIG released core specification 
v2.1, which is noted for introducing the Secure Simple Pairing 
(SSP) protocol to Bluetooth [34]. This was the first major 
security update that SIG published for Bluetooth, providing a 
considerable improvement to the pairing process utilized in 
previous versions [34]. SSP is based upon the Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange, in which devices trade 
public keys and then create a secret key (known as the DHkey) 
utilized to encrypt further communications [35]. 
TABLE I.  DOCUMENTED VULNERABILITIES  
Version Release Year Vulnerability Citation 
1.0 1999 
1. Security Keys 
vulnerable to 
eavesdropping 
1. Jakobsson & 
Wetzel [29] 
2. Security Keys 
vulnerable to cracking 
2. Jakobsson & 
Wetzel [29] 
1.1 2002 
1. Transmission 
vulnerable to MitM* 
attack 
1. Kügler [32] 
1.2 2003 1. Device addresses vulnerable to spoofing 
1. Hager & Midkiff 
[30, 31] 
2.0 2004 
1. Security Keys 
vulnerable to 
eavesdropping 
1. Shaked & Wool 
[33] 
2. Security Keys 
vulnerable to cracking 
2. Shaked & Wool 
[33] 
2.1 2007 
1. SSP PE** vulnerable to 
MitM* attack 
1. Barnickel, et al. 
[26] 
2. SSP PE** vulnerable to 
password guessing 2. Lindell [24] 
3.0 2009 - Specific vulnerabilities not yet found  N/A 
4.0 2010 
1. SSP PE** still 
vulnerable to MitM* 
attack 
1. Phan & Mingard 
[25] 
2. BLE*** vulnerable to 
passive eavesdropping 2. Ryan [27] 
3. BLE*** vulnerable to 
MitM* attack 3. Xu, et al. [28] 
4.1 2013 - Specific vulnerabilities not yet found  N/A 
4.2 2014 - Specific vulnerabilities not yet found  N/A 
*MitM = Man in the Middle 
**SSP PE = Secure Simple Pairing protocol in Passkey Entry mode 
***BLE = Bluetooth Low Energy 
 
While in theory, SSP is a secure protocol, various 
researchers identified that it too contains vulnerabilities. [24, 
26]. By exploiting the use of an unencrypted connection for 
the creation of the secret key, Lindell [24] mounted successful 
attacks that exposed the weakness in the SSP process between 
Bluetooth devices. Barnickel et al. [26] extended Lindell’s 
[24] concerns discovered in the SSP protocol by taking 
advantage of PassKey Entry mode transmissions conducted in 
the clear.  
B. Bluetooth Low Energy Research  
In 2010, the Bluetooth SIG released core specification 
v4.0, which introduced Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to 
promote a focus on devices with less power consumption [36]. 
While previous versions of Bluetooth were limited to larger 
devices such as headphones, laptops, and mobile phones, the 
energy conservation of Bluetooth Low Energy allowed it to be 
utilized in much smaller devices powered by coin-cell 
batteries [13]. Core versions 4.1 and 4.2 (released in 2013 and 
2014, respectively) expanded the functionality of BLE by 
incorporating compatibility with the Internet of Things (IoT) 
and utilizing the IP protocol to decrease power consumption 
further [13].  
Since Bluetooth v2.1 introduced the Secure Simple 
Pairing (SSP) protocol in 2007, five core specification updates 
have been released; v3.0 in 2009, v4.0 in 2010, v4.1 in 2013, 
v4.2 in 2014, and v5.0 in December 2016 [37, 38]. While there 
have been several releases, no documentation has been found 
to indicate a core specification issued by the Bluetooth SIG 
properly addresses the specific security issues that have been 
identified in the literature [24, 26, 39]. The continued use of 
SSP in the Bluetooth protocol stack allows nearly all 
Bluetooth-enabled devices to remain vulnerable to MitM 
attacks, regardless of manufacturer or Bluetooth protocol 
version [40]. Phan and Mingard [25] demonstrated that the 
SSP protocol used in Bluetooth v4.0 (released 2010) is just as 
vulnerable to MitM attacks as it is in v2.1 (released 2007). 
These researchers were able to successfully replicate the 
attack methods utilized by Lindell [24] four years later. This 
weakness remains because SSP in Bluetooth v4.0 is 
implemented in the same flawed way as it originally was 
implemented in v2.1 [34, 41]. No significant updates have 
been issued by the Bluetooth SIG to patch this known 
vulnerability [42]. Phan and Mingard further confirmed 
Lindell’s original findings; SSP Passkey Entry mode remains 
the most utilized Bluetooth authentication method to date, 
prompting it to be the most vulnerable to attack [24, 25]. 
While Bluetooth Low Energy is much more energy 
efficient than its Bluetooth Classic predecessor, research 
shows that these sacrifices in power and sophistication do not 
come without a cost [43]. Xu et al. [28] determine that BLE 
devices are susceptible to MitM attacks because of the 
vulnerabilities by incorporating Bluetooth Low Energy into 
the Bluetooth paring protocol. Similarly, Ryan [27] postulates 
that the concessions made to streamline the Bluetooth Low 
Energy core specification weaken the security of the protocol 
and make data transmitted over BLE connections vulnerable 
to simple attack techniques. The researcher goes on to 
demonstrate how readily-available open source software and 
hardware can be utilized to passively eavesdrop on BLE 
transmissions and to even break its encryption scheme with 
little effort. Ryan concludes that these design choices 
essentially remove any privacy in the Bluetooth Low Energy 
protocol. 
Previous research indicates that vulnerabilities are present 
in a variety of Bluetooth protocols that have been introduced 
over the years. The question that persists is to what extent are 
these protocols being used in a real-world context. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Despite increasing security concerns, Bluetooth users 
continue to use vulnerable versions of the technology’s 
protocol. To acquire an understanding of the versions of 
Bluetooth that are currently being used in the wild, a case 
study was implemented using a design science approach.  
Hevner et al. [44] define Design Science Research (DSR) as 
the creation of technological artifacts to provide solutions for 
problems that exist in the real world.  Hevner, et al. [44] 
provide a framework for conducting DSR which includes the 
phases:  (1) identification of the research problem and 
motivation for finding a solution; (2) definition of solution 
objectives; (3) design and development of the artifact; (4) 
demonstration of the solution; (5) evaluation of the solution; 
(6) communication of the research problem and solution.  
The research problem presented in the introduction 
focused on the construction of a tool to identify Bluetooth 
versions and devices that are used in-the-wild.  The solution 
objective is to capture as much information that is being 
broadcast by a device as possible. The design and 
development involved the identification of the Ubertooth One 
antenna, and viable open source software that could be 
downloaded, i.e., Blue Hydra. Blue Hydra runs on Linux and 
is compatible with Ubuntu. Blue Hydra utilizes a BlueZ Linux 
library to communicate with Bluetooth. The demonstration of 
the software and tool configuration was initially tested in a lab 
to be sure that it was working. The iterative process resulted 
in the development of a toolset that could be utilized to collect 
transmitted Bluetooth data. The components of the toolkit 
developed in this research are available in Table II. A 
screenshot of the tool is provided in Figure. 1. The evaluation 
of the solution is the data collection discussed in the next 
section. 
A. Data Collection  
Data collection lasted for a week starting on Sunday, 
December 4, 2016, at a local coffee shop in Mobile, Alabama, 
USA. The first data collection session lasted for one hour. The 
time span was increased to ninety minutes the following 
session, and this persisted as the constant duration for each 
session for the remainder of the data collection process. There 
was a concern that the vast amount of data collected by the 
Blue Hydra software in such a short period could potentially 
create a memory overflow, resulting in slowed application 
response, hardware errors, or even a system crash. To account 
for this possibility, each data collection session was divided 
into three separate thirty-minute segments. The Blue Hydra 
software was stopped and restarted (along with the 
reinitialization of the Ubertooth One device) for each of these 
segments. For the data collection, the sessions were conducted 
during the afternoon hours. Start times for each session ranged 
between 3:15 PM and 4:30 PM Central Standard Time (CST). 
TABLE II.  TOOLSET COMPONENTS  
Hardware & 
Software Version 
Toshiba Satellite 
P775-S7160 Laptop 
 
• Intel Core i7-2670QM CPU @ 2.20GHz 
x8 processor 
• Mobile Intel HM65 Express (6MB L3 
cache) chipset 
• 8GB DDR3 SDRAM @1333MHz 
(2x4GB) memory 
• 750GB SATA HDD (5400RPM) hard 
drive 
• Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS (64-bit) OS 
Ubertooth One Firmware release: 2015-10-R1 
SENA Parani-UD100 
Bluetooth Adapter UD100-G03, Class 1 device, BT v4.0 
Blue Hydra https://github.com/pwnieexpress/blue_hydra  
Ruby v2.3.1p112 (2016-04-26 revision 54768) [x86_64-linux] 
DB Browser for 
SQLite v3.7.0 (QT v5.5.1, SQLite v3.9.2) 
 
 
Figure 1.  Bluetooth Sniffer 
 
The amount of data allocated for the backup file created 
during each data collection segment was saved in the data 
collection log file. Along with the statistical information 
tallied for the parameters of the data collection process, a total 
file size accumulation was calculated in the log file to prevent 
data storage capacity from becoming a prohibitive factor. 
B. Data Storage 
The information collected about each device included: the 
address, name, vendor, chipset manufacturer, as well as the 
type and version of Bluetooth protocol. Timestamp 
information was also recorded related to device discovery. A 
summary of the database columns is presented in Table III. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The total number of new devices detected for the week 
from December 4, 2016 to December 10, 2016 was 478. The 
daily breakdown for device detection is available in Table IV. 
A range of Bluetooth versions was identified during this 
research. Two interesting results that need to be investigated 
in the future include the 103 devices that were discovered 
running v1.0b and the 189 devices that contained a null value. 
The number of devices discovered by a version of Bluetooth 
is presented in Table V. An illustration of the version 
distribution is offered in Figure 3. 
TABLE III.  DATABASE INFORMATION 
Database Column Description 
Name Device name (manufacturer default, if not defined by the user) 
Address Bluetooth Device Address (BD_ADDR) 
Company Device manufacturer 
LMP Version Identifies Bluetooth (BT) version and subversion 
Manufacturer Bluetooth chipset manufacturer 
Classic Mode Indicates if Bluetooth type identified as BT Classic (T or F) 
LE Mode Indicates if Bluetooth type identified as BLE  (T or F) 
Classic RSSI Timestamps and signal strength values for BT Classic devices 
LE RSSI Timestamps and signal strength values for BLE devices 
Created At Indicates first time device detected (timestamp)  
Last Seen Indicates last time device detected (timestamp) 
TABLE IV.  NEW DEVICES DETECTED DAILY 
Scan Date New Devices 
December 4, 2016 102 
December 5, 2016 15 
December 6, 2016 51 
December 7, 2016 76 
December 8, 2016 88 
December 9, 2016 82 
December 10, 2016 64 
Total 478 
 
The average length of time for device detection for the 
week was 7.75 minutes. The average device detection times 
for each day are presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Average Device Detection Time by Day 
TABLE V.  BLUETOOTH VERSION COUNTS 
Bluetooth Version Count 
v1.0b 103 
v1.1 0 
v1.2 0 
v2.0 1 
v2.1 2 
v3.0 1 
v4.0 16 
v4.1 18 
v4.2 148 
NULL 189 
Total 478 
 
 
Figure 3.   Distribution of Bluetooth Versioning Data 
Seventy-five (75) Bluetooth Classic devices and 403 BLE 
devices were detected. This information is illustrated in Figure 
4.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Distribution of Bluetooth Versioning Data 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The literature review indicates that security vulnerabilities 
are present in Bluetooth protocols. The data collected by the 
Bluetooth sniffer developed as part of this case study indicates 
that a range of Bluetooth protocols is being used in a real-
world context. These devices include mobile phones, tablets, 
computers, televisions, fitness wearables, smart watches, 
automobiles, headphones, speakers, and location trackers, 
among others. The initial data collection supports the idea that 
Bluetooth capabilities present a valid exploitable attack vector 
that potentially places individuals and organizations at risk.  
Future work will build on the database generated by the 
toolkit developed in this research. The database information 
can be utilized to determine the viability of launching 
penetration testing activates. The vitality is determined based 
on the version information, calculating the distance to the 
device, and average device range times. Future research will 
forensically investigate the creation of residual data on a 
compromised Bluetooth-enabled device, and if industry-
accepted mobile device forensic toolkits can detect this data 
in forensically-sound environments. 
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